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The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water 
related issues – which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that of, 
on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their 
characteristics; and, on the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the “rules of the game” 
that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially 
of trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many 
applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, this paper first discusses the non-
cooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Particular 
attention will be given to those directly modelling the process of negotiation, although some attempts 
at finding strategies to maintain the efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. In addition, 
this paper will focus on Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process of 
negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not yet found much 
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1  Introduction 
Bargaining situations are pervasive in today’s life, from marriage to parenthood, to wage 
negotiations; even government policies are the outcome of negotiations amongst different 
parties or interested stakeholders. The interest in the investigation of negotiation theories 
and techniques has significantly increased in the research literature, and has expanded 
from its traditional domain of labour-management relation, to other strategic areas – such 
as trade and natural resources.  
In the theory of negotiation, a ‘conflict’ is interpreted as a situation in which the 
agents, decision makers, or ‘players’
1 could mutually benefit from reaching an 
agreement, but have opposite interests over which agreement to conclude, i.e. how to 
cooperate. Where aims partially diverge, conflict and cooperation become two faces of 
the same coin, and should therefore be dealt with holistically. Negotiation theory seeks to 
identify the variables which determine the outcome of negotiations, bargaining power, 
and power relations, using a game theoretic (GT), formal approach. 
Many natural resource and environmental problems are best handled within a GT 
framework, and by means of formal GT models. In many issues related to natural 
resource management the characteristics of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game are present: the 
dominant strategy for players is not cooperative, and the resulting equilibrium is not 
Pareto efficient – the payoff for at least one individual could be improved, without some 
other individual being made worse off. Despite the fact that the cooperative outcome 
Pareto-dominates the equilibrium, cooperation is unlikely to result without outside 
intervention, or without altering the incentives’ structure, because all parties have 
incentives to free-ride, or defect, and binding agreements are often not possible. The 
allocation of a shared resource size is, on the other hand, often modelled as a game of 
pure conflict – in which the payoffs to one individual imply a reduction in the payoffs of 
his opponents. In these situations, players need to find a strategy to divide the resource in 
a way that is agreeable to all parties, and which possesses some desirable characteristics. 
Often, the allocation rule needs to be self-enforcing, especially in the context of 
                                                           
1 These could be individuals or groups of individuals, sectors, nations, etc..  
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transboundary natural resources, where super-national body to enforce the agreement is 
not present. In order to determine which outcome will result from negotiations over the 
partition of a resource, models of non-cooperative bargaining theory focus on the process 
by which agreement is reached, approximating it through an offer and counteroffer 
procedure, following the seminal work by Rubinstein (1982). In this framework, players 
bargain over the allocation of a surplus of strictly positive size, by making offers over the 
partitions of the cake, or rejecting/accepting opponents’ proposals. This approach does 
not make a priori assumptions over the partition of the cake that will be reached in 
equilibrium, and, for multiple-issues and multilateral bargaining, there are indeed many 
partitions that can be sustained as an equilibrium to the game (see Negotiation Theory – 
Part 1). The approach allows an explicit treatment of issues such as equity and political 
power, which play a very strong role in real-life negotiations. However, it does not allow 
for the possibility of sub-coalitions of players to form: rather, it is implicitly assumed that 
all relevant players take part in the negotiation, and that the final allocation rule is agreed 
by all of them. 
It has been shown in the theoretical literature that cooperation can be sustained as 
an equilibrium outcome in the case of repeated games, even though the incentives to 
defect remain, especially in the case when players’ preference sets are very different (Just 
and Netanyahu (2000)). Cooperative behaviour may be induced by the use of threat 
strategies, whereby deviations from cooperation are punished by reverting to the non-
cooperative behaviour. Threat strategies are only effective if the gains from deviating in 
current periods are outweighed by the benefit losses from future non-cooperative payoffs. 
However, as in many cases the punishers incur costs from implementing the punishment 
strategies, threat strategies may not be credible, and the theoretical models predict that 
the non-cooperative outcome will result. 
Increasingly, negotiated policy making is advocated for as an approach to natural 
resource management, which could improve their management, both domestically and 
internationally. It is in fact widely agreed that negotiated policies are more in line with 
actual needs, are more readily accepted by the people concerned, and are therefore easier 
to implement and enforce.  
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The purpose of the paper is therefore to review the literature on non-cooperative 
bargaining approaches to water related issues – which fall in the category of formal 
models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that of, on the one hand, identify the 
conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their characteristics; and, on 
the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the “rules of the game”, in order 
obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially of 
trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not 
many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. In Section 2, the non-
cooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the 
literature will be discussed. Particular attention will be given to those directly modelling 
the process of negotiation, although some attempts at finding strategies to maintain the 
efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. Negotiations are complex processes, 
especially when more than two parties are involved, and more than one issue is to be 
decided upon. For this reason, Section 3 of this paper is concerned with presenting the 
main elements of Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process 
of negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not 
yet found much use in real life negotiation. The paper will conclude by highlighting the 
key remaining gaps in the literature. 
 
2  Application of negotiation models to water issues 
Most of the literature on water allocation uses optimisation models to characterise the 
most efficient water allocation scheme. Mechanisms proposed typically include: marginal 
cost pricing; public sector allocation (government intervention); water markets; and user 
based allocation (Dinar et al. (1997)). Guiding principles for allocation may focus on 
economic efficiency or equity; the alternative allocation mechanisms respond to the two 
principles in different ways, and to different degrees.  
The economic literature focuses to a large extent on market allocation 
mechanisms (such as tradable water rights). It is argued that these allow the achievement 
of the efficient allocation at the least cost. For instance, Booker and Young (1994) build 
an optimisation model of transferable water rights, which includes a comprehensive  
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hydrological component (including water quality as well as quantity), and models both 
offstream (consumptive) and instream (non-consumptive) water demand. Their non-
linear optimisation model analyses the impact of alternative scenarios for the Colorado 
River basin, with respect to institutions and water demand, over the choice of water 
abstraction and salt discharges. The results indicate that an institutional allocation 
mechanism which allows intrastate water transfers based on both consumptive and non-
consumptive use values significantly improves welfare.  
Although the decentralised market solution is in theory efficient and least cost, 
and maximises welfare (in terms of economic surplus), there are various reasons why it 
may not work within the context of shared waters: for instance, non user values are not 
readily marketable; water is a highly strategic resource, and it is often politicised. Booker 
and Young themselves, in the above mentioned paper, recognise that the inclusion of 
non-consumptive use values is problematic both on technical and equity grounds: these 
benefits are non rival in consumption, and they may have asymmetric consequences for 
the bargaining parties – making the proposed allocation unlikely to be viewed as fair. 
In addition, the fact that water supply may vary stochastically through time 
introduces further complexities in the problem of managing the resource, adding one 
more reason why traditional approaches may not yield the expected welfare improving 
results. Some attempts at addressing uncertain water supply in theoretical models can be 
found in the literature, especially for groundwater resources. For instance, Zeitouni 
(2004) explores the optimal management of aquifers when the stock is uncertain, and 
proves that there is a threshold level determining whether there should be any abstraction 
at all. When pumping costs are sufficiently high, the optimal abstraction coincides with 
water recharge level. Tsur and Zemel (1995) explore how the possibility of irreversible 
changes in groundwater resources affects the optimal management and allocation rules. 
In the presence of such exogenous uncertainty the optimal process does not converge to a 
unique equilibrium steady state, and exploitation policies should be more conservative. 
Using groundwater and reservoirs as buffers against uncertainty can smooth 
stochastic variations in water supply out. Tsur (1990) and Tsur and Graham-Tomasi 
(1991), for instance, explore the role of groundwater as a buffer for stochastic variations 
in surface water levels – and finds that the stabilisation role of groundwater may well be  
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larger than the benefits derived from increasing water supply. Similarly, Roseta-Palma 
and Xepapadeas (2004) explore the role of water reservoirs in protecting users against 
uncertain water supply, and analyse the precautionary behaviour emerging from a robust-
control approach to modelling water resources. In this paper, the authors introduce 
uncertainty over the occurrence of precipitation, in the sense the stochastic process 
followed by precipitation is not perfectly known to the decision maker, and its 
implications for quantitative water used in both a static and a dynamic setting. A 
precautionary behaviour emerges in the dynamic setting, where the decision maker 
lowers surface water abstraction because of the integration of worse-case precipitations.  
All the above mentioned approaches, however, do not address explicitly the issue 
of how to allocate (uncertain) water resources among competing uses, leaving out the 
process of negotiation. 
The strategic and political nature of water, as well as its human right aspect, calls 
for a different approach to the allocation problem, one which considers the strategic 
behaviour of actors, as well as their motivations. Negotiation models can therefore 
provide very helpful insights into the actual allocation of water resources – by identifying 
strategies which may sustain cooperation as an outcome, and by taking into account 
strategic behaviour and social/political feasibility of the allocation proposed, as well as 
power asymmetries, incomplete information, and other relevant aspects of the process. 
2.1  Ground water management 
Groundwater exploitation is a typical case of open access resource, where externalities in 
consumption, therefore, exist. Although the paradoxical empirical results first obtained 
by Gisser and Sanchez (1980)
2 have persisted in the groundwater literature, this has not 
prevented a substantial literature to develop, exploring the welfare implication of 
different management regimes. 
                                                           
2 What has become Gisser-Sanchez effect basically states that the magnitude of the benefits from optimally 
managing groundwater resources is negligible. The result rests mainly on the theoretical assumption of very 
steep groundwater use benefit curves (implying relative price insensitiveness of users), and on empirical 
observations comparing central control and open access management regimes for groundwater exploitation 
of the Pecos Basin in New Mexico. For a recent criticism to the Gisser-Sanchez effect see, for instance, 
Kounduri (2004).   
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  For instance, Dixon (1999) models a simplified version of groundwater 
exploitation, in which there are two agents with access to one of two interdependent and 
identical groundwater cells. Each agent lowers the water table in his own cell by 
pumping. The water table rises due to exogenous recharge, and water flows between the 
two cells according to specified environmental parameters. Agents maximise net benefits 
from water abstraction, subject to the equation of motion for the depth of water in each 
cell. This is a typical situation in which appropriation externalities exist – that is, in 
which actions by one agent have negative impacts on the benefits to other agents – and in 
which uncoordinated exploitation leads to inefficient outcomes. Dixon proceeds by 
estimating the non-cooperative, the optimal, and the collusive solutions (open and closed 
loop), and then compares the resulting welfare levels
3.  
Under the myopic (non-cooperative) solution, each agent maximises his own net 
benefits, Πi
my discounted using the private discount factor, without taking into account 
the externalities of their water extraction on future water level. Under the socially optimal 
solution, the impact of pumping on ground-water levels is accounted for. Total profits, 
Πi
*, are maximised using the social discount factor, and the payoffs are equally split 
between the two identical users. Cooperative behaviour can be determined using two 
different solution concepts. Under open-loop solutions, agents maximise net present 
discounted
4 value,  Πi
OL, given the withdrawal of the others. The solution is a Nash 
equilibrium. Payoffs are larger than in the myopic case but, since agents still fail to 
account for the negative externalities imposed on others (stock externality), they are 
lower than the optimal payoff. The open loop solution overlooks strategic responses
5, in 
which players pre-empt the opponents by extracting more (strategic externality). Yet, it 
can be realistic when players do not observe the state of the resource, for instance, and 
therefore cannot respond to opponents’ moves, or when some sort of binding agreement 
can be signed. When players behave strategically, the closed-loop solution should be 
used, which does not overlook strategic response, and predicts that users adjust their 
                                                           
3 When the social and private discount factors are equal, the social optimal is equivalent to the cooperative 
solution. 
4 Using real private discount rate. 
5 By assumption, in the open loop solution each agent take the opponent’s extraction path as given.  
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extraction paths according to observed actions by other players. The sub-game perfect 
equilibrium extraction paths (and payoffs) of the closed loop solution, Πi
CL, incorporate 




Dixon applies this simplified model to groundwater use in the Joaquin Valley, 
taking baseline parameters from the existing literature when available, and making 
reasonable assumptions about the discount rate and length of the game. The results 
confirm the theoretical expectations: the difference between Πi
* and Πi
OL is given by the 
stock externality, and accounts for 18% of the overall difference between the collusive 
(optimal) and myopic payoffs. The strategic externality is measured by the difference 
between  Πi
CL and Πi
OL, and amounts for another 7%. As expected, the myopic 
equilibrium is the farthest from the optimal equilibrium, with a 75% difference in 
payoffs.  
For trigger strategies
6 to be feasible, agents must first agree on what to play in the 
periods prior to deviation – that is, they must agree on the cooperative exploitation paths. 
In addition, it is assumed that players can observe others’ actions. Dixon considers the 
trigger strategy in which a player extracts the collusive amount as long as all the others 
do the same in the preceding period. If one agent defects, all agents will return to the 
closed-loop equilibrium strategies for all successive periods. If the set of trigger strategies 
is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (that is, if for each player j the best response is to 
play it, given that all other players also play it in each period), then collusion can be 
sustained as an equilibrium outcome of the game. 
Simulating the solutions for a given set of parameters, and varying the discount 
rate to assess its impact on the stability of trigger strategies of the kind described above, 
the author shows that, for reasonable parameters and low enough discount rates, it is 
possible for agents to set up a self-enforcing agreement to play the collusive solution – 
the “tragedy of the commons” is not necessarily the outcome of non-cooperative ground-
water exploitation. The critical value of the discount factor below which the set of trigger 
strategies does not form an equilibrium is 0.53 (for a discount rate of 0.89).  
                                                           
6 A trigger strategy is defined as a strategy in which a player starts by cooperating, and continues to 
cooperate provided that the opponent also cooperates. If the opponents cheat, then the player reverts to the 
non-cooperative strategy for a pre-defined period of time.   
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In the literature of game theoretic applications to natural resources, various 
authors propose the use of differential games
7 to explore resource use strategies, and their 
efficiency and sustainability properties. In fact, resources are intrinsically dynamic – 
especially renewable resources, which vary through time according to the rate of growth 
of the resource stock, and other parameters. In the water realm, most applications are 
found in the groundwater literature. For instance, Provencher and Burt (1993) estimate 
the rate of groundwater extraction under common property management regime, 
identifying the externalities present under this management strategy, and investigating the 
effects of different risk-aversion parameters for water users.  
In this paper, the outcome emerges from dynamic strategies and the resulting 
resource evolution. The solution concept used is that of Feedback (or closed-loop) Nash 
equilibrium, where solutions assume that the state of the system at any one time depends 
on the past choices and outcomes, not only on the initial state
8. Similarly, the same 
authors (Provencher and Burt (1994)) apply a dynamic model to compare the welfare 
effects of different property rights regime for groundwater pumping, when players have 
different risk-aversion factors: central (optimal) control dominates private property with 
tradable permits when water users are risk neutral, but with risk-averse firms both 
regimes are sub-optimal, and tradable property rights can be a feasible and desirable 
alternative to central control. This is because the market for permits provides 
opportunities for risk management in the face of changing conditions, flexibility which 
central control does not allow. Furthermore, in cases in which the value of a resource is 
lower under the private property rights regime than under command and control, in 
practice this difference is small, and the private property regime may be preferable on the 
grounds of easier implementation. 
                                                           
7 Differential games belong to a subclass of dynamic games called “state space games”, where a set of state 
variables describe the state of the dynamic system at any point in time during the game. The hypothesis is 
that the influence of past decisions on the payoffs at subsequent times is captured adequately by the 
evolution over time of the state variables. When the laws of motion of the state variable can be modelled in 
continuous time, the state space game becomes a differential games, whereas in the case of discrete time 
variables, the game is a difference game. Differential games, therefore, combine the principles of game 
theory, calculus of variation and control theory, to determine the strategic interactions between players in a 
dynamic context. 
8 Open Loop Nash Equilibria strategies, by contrast, assume that the controls depend on the initial state of 
the system under investigation, and time.  
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These approaches, however, concentrate on the efficiency and optimal control of 
groundwater exploitation, rather than on the “real-life” issue of allocating water among 
competing users – which is the main object of negotiating water policies.
 9 
2.2  Allocation among sectors  
Competition among sectors for water use is the status quo in many countries, where often 
there is a conflict between agricultural and urban use, and environmental sustainability 
constraints. Negotiation over water allocation typically involves bargaining over multiple 
issues (for instance, water abstraction, as well as water quality), and multiple players – 
different user groups of the resource, e.g. farmers, urban dwellers, recreational users. 
A multi-person, multiple issues, negotiation model for water allocation is that 
developed by Rausser and Simon (1992). Their model is a framework for non-
cooperative, multilateral negotiation that explicitly incorporates the structure of the 
process, such as the input of each player in the bargaining, the partition of groups into 
sub-groups, and the issue space. In the bargaining game, a finite number of players select 
a policy from some collection of possible alternatives. Among the set of possible 
allocations, there is a disagreement policy, which will be imposed if the players fail to 
reach an agreement by the terminal time T. The authors examine the limit points of the 
equilibrium outcomes of the finite bargaining horizon game, as the time horizon is 
extended without bounds. The limit points are interpreted as a proxy for the equilibria of 
the bargaining game with finite but arbitrarily large bargaining rounds. 
Let I = {1,…,I} denote the finite set of players in the negotiation game, indexed 
by i. Players choose a policy package  X x∈ , where X is assumed to be a compact subset 
on the n-dimensional Euclidean space, and n denotes the number of issues to be 
negotiated.  
                                                           
9 In fact, approaching the issue of groundwater management using non-cooperative bargaining models 
could be quite useful even for development projects, such as the Groundwater and Soil Conservation 
project implemented in Nepal, and sponsored by the World Bank: in that context, exploring how the 
various stakeholders – farmers, local councils of different villages, government institutions, etc – view the 
water abstraction and the pattern of land use to identify proposals acceptable to all parties could have 
facilitated implementation, especially in the observed context of weak institutional presence.  
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For an agreed upon policy vector  x
ρ
, player i gets a utility of  ) (x ui
ρ
, whereas 
player i's disagreement payoff is 
0 u
ρ
. By assumption, the set of admissible coalition is I = 
{1,…,I} that is, unanimity is needed to reach an agreement. The game has a finite number 
of rounds T. 
The negotiation game is played in the following way: at each round t < T, 
provided no agreement has yet been reached, a proposer is chosen according to 
exogenously specified vector of access probabilities,  I i i w w ∈ = ) (
ρ
. The probability of 
player i being chosen, wi, is such that 0 < wi < 1, and ∑ =
i i w 1. The access probability of 
a player can be interpreted as her “political effectiveness”. The selected player makes a 
proposal for the policy vector in X, and the other players vote on whether to accept or 
reject it. If the proposal is accepted by all players, the game ends. Otherwise, another 
player is selected randomly to be a proposer in the next round. If the final round T is 
reached, and no policy vector in X has been unanimously agreed upon, the disagreement 
policy vector is imposed on players, who receive a payoff of 
0 u
ρ
. In the model, it is 




The sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game can be characterised as follows: 
⇒ At the terminal time T, player j accepts a proposal by player i ( i≠j) iff 
j
T
i j u x u
0 ) ( ≥ , that is, a player will only accept an offer in the final round, if it 
gives her at least as much utility as her disagreement payoff. 
⇒ Similarly, at time t < T, player j  accepts a proposal by i iff 










i j x u w x u
ρ
, that is, if it yields at least as much utility as the expected 
continuation payoff, i.e. the wi-weighted sum of the utilities obtained from all 
parties’ (including herself) proposals in the following round. 
The authors show that, if X is compact and each player utility is strictly quasi-
concave in X, the game can be solved recursively to yield a unique solution vector, 
consisting of an equilibrium proposal in X for each player. Players propose their 
equilibrium policy vector whenever they are chosen to be the proposer in the first round 
(like in the Rubinstein’s model). Moreover, with probability 1, the other players will 
accept the proposal in round one. Convergence is ensured by the characteristics of the  
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disagreement outcome: if no compromise is reached in the last round, then a pre-specified 
disagreement policy is imposed, which yields to all players a lower utility than any 
negotiated outcome. 
The Rausser-Simon model of multilateral, multi-issues negotiation has been 
applied to water allocation problems in two different contexts: Adams et al. (1996) apply 
it to water allocation in California, where disputes over water resources are very common 
because of the conflicting demands of the large agricultural industry, expanding urban 
population, and strong environmental groups. The model is applied to the so-called “three 
way negotiations”, whereby the three major stakeholder groups (agricultural and urban 
users, and environmentalists) informally negotiate water allocation regimes – the degree 
to which water rights are transferable, the type and level of environmental standards, and 
the level of infrastructure development. 
Thoyer et al. (2001) and Simon et al. (2003) apply the Rausser-Simon model to 
negotiations over water use, water storage capacity, and user prices in France, where 
seven players (one farmer group for each of the three sub-basins of the river; two 
environmental groups; a water manager; and a representative of elected local councils, 
called “taxpayer”) bargain over seven policy dimensions (levels of irrigation quotas per 
hectare of cultivated land, in each of the sub-basins; residual flows allocated to 
environmental services; the price of water; and the size of three reservoir dams). 
These two situations, with their differences and similarities, offer good test cases 
for the Rausser-Simon model. Group preference ranking over the set of policies is 
specified, and utility functions constructed and estimated. Environmental and budgetary 
constraints are also modelled. The authors simulate the model under different scenarios, 
in order to analyse the impact of changes in the institutional setting of the game on the 
negotiated agreement. The parameters analysed are: bargaining power, measured by 
players’ access probability; heterogeneity (between and within group); and issue space. 
The results are consistent with intuition: in both applications, (i) increasing the 
political weight of a group leads to an allocated outcome relatively more favourable to 
that group – and of groups who have similar preferences. The political weight of a group, 
however, is not its sole source of bargaining power: the default strength, that is, the 
relative utility derived in case the no agreement policy is imposed, is also a source of  
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bargaining power. In Adams et al. (1996), the results of the simulations indicate that 
asymmetries in the disagreement payoff of the bargaining groups result in different 
negotiated agreement: more specifically, (ii) the higher is a group’s utility in 
disagreement, the more bargaining power the group has – and, therefore, the more 
favourable to that group the negotiated agreement is.  
In Thoyer et al. (2001), the simulations confirm the intuition with respect to the 
effect of removing one player from the negotiating table: that is, the resulting allocation 
scheme will be further away from the excluded group’s preferred position than when the 
group takes active part in the bargaining. More interestingly, a player’s preferences 
influence the negotiated agreement even when her political weight is zero, but she takes 
part in the negotiation process without intervening. This is a consequence of unanimity 
being the decision making rule.  
In their California application, Adams et al explore the effects of removing one 
policy dimension from the negotiated policy package, and of restricting its interval 
admissible values. Through their simulations, the authors conclude that significant gains 
from bargaining are lost when one policy dimension is excluded, and that restricting the 
admissible values a dimension can take has a non-linear impact on players’ utilities. So, 
for instance, when the range of admissible levels for infrastructure development is 
restricted, the utility of the group preferring less infrastructure to more increases for less 
stringent restriction, whilst the others’ utilities decrease. Eventually, however, even the 
utility of this group will start declining. The authors explain these results as a shrinking of 
the bargaining set – the mutual gains to be had through negotiations are lower. 
Adams et al. (1996) examine the impact of within-group heterogeneity on the 
final negotiated outcome, and the effect of imposing a spokesperson, who maximises the 
averaged utilities of the coalition members – with the effect of reducing group’s 
heterogeneity. In the first case, the group of farmers is divided into two sub-groups, A 
and B, with different preferences over only one policy dimension. In this case, agreement 
requires only quasi-unanimous approval, that is, agreement among the environmental and 
urban user groups, with either of A or B joining the sub-coalition. Intuitively, increasing 
the distance between A’s and B’s preferred negotiated outcome should weaken the 
groups’ bargaining power, as the two sub-groups compete to represent the interest of  
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farmers. In reality, the effect of different preferences over one policy issue (water transfer 
in the simulation) is affected by groups’ relative preferences over another policy variable 
(infrastructure investment in the simulation). In addition, the simulation analyses indicate 
that when there is a significant divergence of interests between coalition members, the 
introduction of a spokesperson will usually benefit the coalition as a whole. Yet, this is so 
because the negotiator can discriminate against one member: the negotiated allocation 
may therefore require side payments to be feasible, and induce the non favoured group to 
join. Further, changing the decision rule away from unanimity strengthens the negative 
effect of within group heterogeneity, as sub-groups compete to form larger coalitions. 
The analytical framework proposed can be applied to water resources to achieve 
sustainable governance, and it explicitly models the negotiation process recognising the 
importance of relative political influence and power in determining the disagreement 
outcome. The outcome of multilateral multi-issue negotiations depends crucially on the 
constitutional structure of the negotiation process, as well as groups’ preferences and 
internal structures. Moreover, by carefully selecting the issues to be negotiated over, and 
the stakeholders to take part in the bargaining, the decision maker can manipulate the 
outcome of the bargaining process.  
Although the Rausser-Simon model provides a useful tool to support negotiations, 
it has some simplifications that limit its applicability. First of all, convergence of the 
results relies on all players preferring any negotiated agreement to the default policy – yet 
this may not necessarily be the case, especially when some user groups are closer to the 
government than others.  
In addition, the model structure implies perfect information, whereas not only 
groups may not be fully aware of the preferences of other groups, but also they may not 
have themselves a clear ranking and tradeoffs amongst issues negotiated upon. Strategic 
misrepresentation of group preferences may also alter the result of the negotiation in 
practice, although this aspect fails to be captured by the model.  
Water resources are assumed to be deterministic and known at all points in time. 
Although in Simon et al. (2003) different scenarios are modelled – depending on the 
assumed abundance of water – they are all deterministic, and do not affect players’ 
preferences, ranking, or strategies. The traditional features of the model can be extended  
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to include issues such as asymmetric information, moral hazard, uncertainty, and network 
formation, (Rausser (2000)), but, to our knowledge, no attempts have yet been made. 
2.3  Allocation among countries  
Water resources are typically transboundary: allocation procedures and mechanisms are 
more problematic in this context, as widely discussed in the literature of international 
agreements (see for instance, Hanley and Folmer (1998)), as they require agreement 
among sovereign states as opposed to intra-country jurisdiction. The two main 
characteristics of the problem are: countries’ welfare are interdependent, through water 
quantity/quality; and all solutions to the allocation problem must be consistent with the 
principle of national sovereignty – that is, a country’s compliance with the agreement 
must be strictly voluntary and self-enforcing.  
A feature peculiar only to international river (as opposed to boundary rivers, seas 
or enclosed sea basins) is the unidirectionality of river flow, which makes the allocation 
process even more difficult. Within this context, static games may generate outcomes in 
which the dominant strategy for the upstream country is not to cooperate, whereas the 
downstream country’s dominant strategy is to cooperate. In this context, the resulting 
equilibrium is not efficient.  
Side payments
10 have been suggested in the literature as means to induce the 
upstream country to internalise the externality. In repeated games, coordination problems 
can be resolved, and the cooperative action can be the resulting equilibrium of the game – 
interaction over time introduces the possibility of rewarding cooperative actions. 
This approach is embedded in the papers by Ambec and Sprumont (2000) and 
Kilgour and Dinar (2001), Kilgour and Dinar (1995) where compensation schemes are 
bargained over, which ensure the attainment of the “optimal” water allocation scheme in 
the international context. Similarly, Supalla et al. (2002) investigate a scheme in which a 
second price auction is implemented in order to establish the contribution of each user 
                                                           
10 When there are gains to be made from cooperation, but these are not equally distributed, cooperation can 
be achieved through the transfer of (part of) these gains from the parties who stand to gain to those who 
loose. The latter group is made at least as well off as under the non-cooperative arrangement.   
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group to a fixed amount of water for instream services, and how payments can be 
apportioned, to ensure the agreement is enforceable.  
Although the repeated game approach with side payment resolves the problem of 
coordination when a unidirectional externality is present, the resulting equilibrium may 
be seen as an application of the “victim pays” principle, as the downstream country has to 
effectively bribe the upstream country not to over-consume or over-pollute water. This 
regime may be undesirable: first, there is large consensus over the “polluter pays 
principle”
11; second, and perhaps more importantly, countries are reluctant to implement 
“victim pays”, as this strategy is likely to earn victims a reputation of weak negotiators. 
Bennet et al. (1998) propose a different approach to solving unidirectional externalities in 
water sharing between countries, one which relies on issue linkage, rather than side 
payments. Similarly, Bhaduri and Barbier (2003) investigate the effects of linking the 
implementation of the Ganges River Agreement to a separate negotiation over water 
augmentation from Nepal. Despite the encouraging results shown in the literature on 
issue linkage, Just and Netanyahu (2000) question the welfare improving qualities of 
issue linkage in negotiation, which is useful only in cases where there are strong 
asymmetries in payoffs, and equity is a concern. 
 
2.3.1  International water allocation with side payments 
 
In Ambec and Sprumont (2000), the focus of the model is on the asymmetric access to 
water that countries have. In contrast with the majority of literature, which focuses on the 
problem of designing suitable institutions and mechanisms for sharing the resource, this 
paper is concerned with welfare allocation. A water allocation mechanism, to be 
sustainable, should be stable in the sense of the core (i.e. give coalition members at least 
as much utility as their secure level of welfare), and distribute welfare fairly. As fairness 
is not a universal concept, the definition given by the authors is that a welfare distribution 
is fair if no coalition or individual enjoys a welfare higher than its aspiration level, that is, 
higher than the welfare level it would enjoy in the absence of all other players – that is, if 
                                                           
11 Of course, whether the upstream or the downstream country should bear the burden of the agreement 
depends on the initial property rights allocation, on the perceived fairness of the allocation rule, on the 
countries’ relative political and economic power, development stage,…  
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it could use all the water available. The authors proceed as follows: first, they adopt a 
theoretical, cooperative approach to characterise an efficient and equitable welfare 
sharing arrangement. Then, they focus on non cooperative arrangements and 
decentralised behaviour, which could sustain the “optimal” solution. 
Let I = {1,…,I} be the set of agents sharing a river, which flows through their 
location, and order them according to their position, with i < j meaning that i is upstream 
of j. Agents have a utility function (differentiable, strictly concave and strictly increasing) 
defined over water and money, of the form  i i i i i i t x b t x u + = ) ( ) , (  - where xi represents 
water allocated to player i, and ti is player i's net money transfer. The river picks up 
volume along its course, increasing by a specified amount ei > 0 between any two 
locations. A consumption plan is any vector 
I R x + ∈ . An allocation is a vector 









i i e x 0 ) ( , for every  I j∈ , with Pj denoting the set of 
predecessors to player i. 
Let 
I R z∈  be a vector of welfare distribution of some allocations x and t.  
The optimal allocation, which defines an allocation (x*(I),t*(I)), is Pareto efficient 
if it maximises the sum of all agents’ benefits, and wastes no money. The core stability 
constraint and the fairness constraints (determining lower and upper bounds on welfare) 
single out the optimal consumption plan. Ambec and Sprumont prove that the only 
welfare distribution which satisfies both core stability and fairness constraints is the 
downstream incremental distribution, which lexicographically maximises the welfare of 
agent i, and its predecessors, subject to the core constraint.  
The authors consider two forms of decentralised behaviour: myopic competitive 
behaviour, and sophisticated strategic behaviour. In the former, a decentralised market 
structure is imposed through the allocation of tradable water rights: however, in order to 
achieve downstream incremental distribution, it is necessary to know players’ 
preferences. Allocating an equal share of property rights to agents, in particular, does not 
always lead to the stable and equitable welfare allocation defined above.  
Strategic behaviour is, on the other hand, to be expected when the number of 
players is small. Modelling the problem in a game theoretic context, the authors argue  
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that it is possible to implement in a sub-game perfect equilibrium the downstream 
incremental welfare distribution. The game is an extensive form non-cooperative 
bargaining game in which i, i-1,…,2,1 are successively allowed to make offers, which the 
others can either accept or reject. If player i's allocation offer is rejected, she gets the 
bundle (xn,tn)=(ei,0), and agent i-1 gets to propose an allocation for i-1 players. If the 
proposal is unanimously accepted, it is enforced in the successive stage. Otherwise, 
player i-1 gets a bundle (en-1,0). If the last stage of the game is reached, then player 2 
proposes an allocation for 2 players, which is enforced if player 1 agrees. Otherwise, 
player 2 and 1 get allocation (e2,0) and (e1,0) respectively. Backward induction shows 
that the downstream incremental welfare distribution is generated for every sub-game 
perfect equilibrium of the game and for every preference profile. 
As the Rausser and Simon models presented before, the model proposed by 
Ambec and Sprumont assumes perfect information and deterministic water supply. In 
addition, water allocation is determined according to optimality and efficiency principles, 
which do not take into account the strategic and political nature of the resource. Only 
monetary transfers are bargained over, and it is assumed that they can compensate for 
water transfers fully. Lastly, the model so formulated focuses on the rival aspect of water 
consumption, ignoring the non rival nature of water. Moreover, the marginal cost of 
consumption never exceeds the benefits. 
A similar problem is analysed by Kilgour and Dinar (1995) and Kilgour and Dinar 
(2001), where the possible welfare improving consequences of a more flexible water 
allocation scheme that takes into account not only the underlying hydrology, geography 
and economic conditions in a river basin, but also annual fluctuations in river flow, is 
investigated. What is proposed by the authors is an annual adjustment of allocation on the 
basis of new data and information gathered, which increases the accuracy of water 
quantity assessment. This adjustable scheme improves total welfare, relative to best fixed 
scheme. Whereas water allocation is uniquely determined, the monetary transfers are 
determined by the structure of the bargaining game: standard cooperative game theory 
models can be applied to produce a specification of the efficient compensation scheme. It 
turns out that, for a two person bargaining problem, virtually all the standard solution 
concepts yield the same result: the surplus benefit from compensation is divided equally  
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between the two agents. It would be interesting to explore the result given by a 
negotiation framework over both water sharing and money transfer – rather than 
cooperative agreements over monetary transfers alone – including some notion of 
fairness in the procedure.  
2.3.2  Auction games 
 
A different approach is adopted by Supalla et al. (2002), who apply auction theory to 
determine the shares of water for environmental services in the Platte river to be provided 
by the three states sharing the river.  
The Platte River flows through Colorado, Wyoming and Nebraska. Conflicts over 
water use – both within and among states – are rampant. In addition, the river system 
provides critical habitat for fish and wildlife. The central resource management problem 
is that there is insufficient water to satisfy competing consumptive needs, and instream 
flow for species conservation.  
Supalla et al use an auction mechanism to model part of the decision making 
process in the Platte river system. The issue of who is to supply a previously agreed 
(exogenously given, and determined by environmental services requirements) quantity of 
water to instream services is addressed within this framework.  
The auction is designed as a second price, sequential auction game, with repeated 
bidding and predetermined cost shares. The only players are the three states. Each of 
them bids in a pre-determined order to supply a given quantity of water (a block). The 
bidding is repeated until all parties except one (the low bidder) have passed. The block is 
then supplied by the low bidder, at a price equal to the second lowest bid. Note that cost 
shares are predetermined, and determine how much each state has to contribute to the 
common pool funds to purchase water for instream services.  
Consider a set of agents N = {1,2,3}, consisting of the three states (Colorado, 
Nebraska and Wyoming respectively). Cost shares
12 are predetermined, and denoted by 
sn. The cost of supplying a quantity q is determined by water acquisition cost (ACn), and 
third party cost (TPn), that is, costs incurred by parties not directly involved in the 
procurement decision. In addition, states incur a political cost, PCn, where PCn represent 
an “equity” payment above the real opportunity cost of supplying a block of water, which  
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states may require as compensation for the political difficulties associated with 
reallocating water away from domestic consumption. All costs, with the exception of the 
political cost
13, are common knowledge, and differ among states. States are induced to 
reveal their (true) supply preferences when each block of water is auctioned, by choosing 
either to supply it, or to pay someone else for its provision. The auction works in the 
following way: the winning bidder, j, supplies the block of water at a cost Cj(q), and 
receives a payment equal to the second lowest bid, B. However, the winner has to pay its 
predetermined share of supply cost, sj. The payoff from winning is therefore (1-sj)B-
Cj(q). The other players have to pay their pre-determined share of cost. In this case, 
players losing the auction incur a positive cost. It is well documented that, for a sealed 
bid second price auction, it is a dominant strategy for players to announce costs 
truthfully, but the model adopted by Supalla et al uses a descending order English auction 
design that does not necessarily lead to truthful cost revelation: however, because of the 
repeated nature of the game, it results in the same strategic actions. This strategy profile 
is a Nash equilibrium, and it is such that all players bid until only the two lowest cost 
players are left; then the agent with the second lowest cost stops at his costs, and the 
lowest cost player wins the auction with a bid equal to (or slightly below) the second 
lowest cost. 
Supalla et al estimate the AC and TP costs for the three states on the basis of 
existing data: acquisition costs were imputed from the existing literature, whereas TP 
costs were estimated assuming that only water from irrigation could be diverted: hence, 
TP costs were assumed to be the indirect economic losses associated with lower 
agricultural activity (e.g. lower employment levels, or lower yields). 
The inclusion of political costs is a mechanism for reaching an agreement where 
one would otherwise not exist, and to model the fact that political and strategic 
considerations are also at play, when deciding who should contribute the water for 
environmental services. PC costs are assumed to escalate exponentially with the quantity 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 In addition the three states’ contribution, the Federal Government contributes a fixed share, s4. 
13 If all costs were known, for any given quantity of water Q, one could analytically solve for the cost 
minimising shares for each state.  
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of water supplied by one state, i.e., with the needed reallocation from national 
consumptive use to in-stream uses. 
Simulations of the second price auction to determine the share of instream water 
to be supplied by each state show that, if no political compensation is allowed, Nebraska 
would need to supply 79% of the water for environmental uses. This result is due to the 
fact that most of the low-cost water is to be found in Nebraska – yet this cost minimising 
scheme is unlikely to be politically acceptable. Nebraska is unlikely to be willing to 
supply so much of the water, and compensations are therefore necessary to find an 
agreement. Under moderate compensation, the aggregate cost of supplying the required 
amount of instream water increases by 16% per year, but the burden sharing is more 
likely to be accepted by all states. Even more so under a scheme of high compensation – 
although supply costs increase by 30%.  
The inclusion of political compensation in a second price auction increases the 
budgetary cost of providing the required amount of water, relative to the theoretical 
minimum cost, but at the same time it increases the probability that the supply 
arrangement will be implemented. In a real world setting, however, the real minimum is 
not known, and the second price auction at least minimises welfare costs, because the 
bidder with the lowest cost actually supplies the water. The actual cash transfer may be 
higher by an amount equal to the difference between the winning bid and the next highest 
price. The second price auction, and the inclusion of political compensation, change the 
sharing of welfare among the parties, but do not affect total welfare (the loss to the 
paying parties equal the gain to the receiving party). The political compensation makes 
the water supply plan politically acceptable. 
The simulations suggest that second price sequential auction is an effective tool to 
induce participants to reveal their true minimum price for supplying different quantities 
of water and guarantee that a feasible solution is found, although actual costs would 
depend on how much political compensation is required. 
The interesting feature of the model proposed by Supalla et al is the explicit 
inclusion of the political and strategic aspects linked to water sharing. Political feasibility 
of the allocation scheme (equivalent to some form of equity concern) has the effect of 
driving a wedge between the (economic) efficient agreement, and the actual outcome of a  
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negotiation process. It is therefore clear that efficiency cannot be the only consideration, 
when determining water allocation or cost sharing schemes. The inclusion of political 
considerations creates a bargaining space, which would not otherwise exist in practice – 
although the game theoretic models would indicate its existence in theory. 
It would be interesting to extend the model proposed by Supalla et al. (2002) to 
include negotiation over the quantity of water to be released for instream services, rather 
than only to determine which states should supply it, and at what cost. A two-level game, 
similar in concept to the one described in Section 3.4, could provide the required tools. 
A similar effect to the introduction of political compensation payment in the 
second price auction described by Supalla et al. (2002) can be obtained by linking water 
sharing to other issue of interest to at least two of the parties. Issue linkages play an 
important role in solving international externalities, especially in cases in which side-
payments would be needed, resulting in “victim pays principle”.  
 
2.3.3  Issue linkage 
 
Bennet et al. (1998) propose a modelling framework in which two players, engaged in 
negotiations over separate issues, may gain by linking the issue in a nested game 
(Tsebelis, (1990)). It is argued that countries with weak negotiation position often try to 
improve their leverage by linking issues: modelling water allocation non-cooperative 
bargaining situations as interconnected games can generate outcomes that cannot be 
obtained when issues are modelled independently. Issue linkages enlarges the bargaining 
set, by allowing countries to condition the outcome in the water allocation negotiations to 
past outcomes in non-water games. Two case studies are presented, in which the 
equilibrium of the negotiation game is non-cooperative, if the water allocation game is 
played in isolation, but a water sharing agreement can be found, if countries link water 
allocation to other issues. One of these is presented in more detail. 
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, water conflicts in the Aral Sea have 
increased dramatically, and water quality has deteriorated. There are several factors that 
make it very difficult for countries to reach an agreement over water sharing, primarily 
the highly strategic role of water as a major input for food production, which make it the 
dominant strategy for each country to pursue uncoordinated, individual strategies. Bennet   
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et al. (1998) model water sharing between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as a nested game: 
Tajikistan has the choice of developing the Amu Darya river to gain additional water, 
whereas Uzbekistan has to decide whether or not to support rebel groups in Tajikistan; in 
the other game, Tajikistan has to decide whether to abate air pollution affecting 
Uzbekistan – who can either subsidise abatement activities in Tajikistan, or not. If the 
games where played separately, the dominant strategies would be Divert and Support, 
with a payoff of [0,0], in the first game; and No abatement and No subsidies in the second 
game. These outcomes are clearly sub-optimal. If the games are played in a nested 
fashion, Uzbekistan’s dominant strategies are Not support and No subsidies, whereas 
Tajikistan’s are Divert and Abate. The payoff matrixes are reproduced below. 
 
A) The Amu Darya River Game 
   Tajikistan 
   Not  divert Divert 
2   -2    Don’t support
 1   1.5 
1   0   
Uzbekistan 
Support 
 -1    0 
 
B) The Air Pollution Game 
   Tajikistan 
   Abate  Don’t  abate
3   -3    Subsidise 
 1   2 
4   0   
Uzbekistan 
Don’t 
subsidise  -1    0 
 
C) The Nested Game 
   Tajikistan 








5   -1    1    -5    No support 
Subsidies   2   3   2.5    3.5 
6   2   2    -2  
 
No support 
No subsidies    0    1    0.5   1.5 
4   -2    3    -3    Support 
Subsidies   0   1    1   2 
5   1   4    0  
Uzbekistan 
Support 




By allowing countries to link outcomes of the negotiations for the Amu Darya 
river basin and air quality, the bargaining space has been enlarged, and all countries are 
better off.  
Similar results are obtained in another application: allocating water of the 
Euphrates between Turkey and Syria, linked to a game in which water pollution levels by 
Syria in the Orontes River basin is also negotiated.  
Although the results obtained are interesting and encouraging, care must be taken 
in advocating for issue linkages: the payoffs used in the games are theoretical, and may 
well not reflect the true preference ranking of the players. It has been shown in the 
theoretical literature that, as long as the payoffs are of the same order of magnitude and 
represent the true ranking of players’ preferences, and the games have asymmetric 
prisoner’s dilemma payoffs structure, then the theoretical payoffs will suffice to illustrate 
the benefits of issue linkage (p. 74, Bennet et al. (1998)). However, careful consideration 
of the actual payoff is needed, to ensure that the theoretical ranking is indeed a true 
reflection of countries’ preferences. 
In the paper by Bhaduri and Barbier (2003), there is an attempt to link water 
transfers, and international water allocation negotiations. The authors examine the scope 
of extending the recent Ganges water sharing agreement
14 between India and Bangladesh, 
linking it to an additional provision of water augmentation from Nepal. It is argued that 
this issue linkage would improve the negotiating leverage of the weaker (downstream) 
country, Bangladesh, and deter India from diverting water in excess of the share agreed 
under the treaty. 
The existing treaty contains no provision of water transfers from third parties, yet 
there are serious concerns that in the near future there will be an acute shortage of water 
to satisfy increasing water demands in both India and Bangladesh. By creating water 
storage facilities in Nepal, surplus water could be released to the Ganges during drought 
periods. As water release from Nepal is non-separable between India and Bangladesh, 
any such augmentation scheme would need to be negotiated by the three countries, and it 
                                                           
14 The Ganges River Treaty was signed between India and Bangladesh in 1996. For a detailed overview of 
the dispute between India and Bangladesh over sharing the Ganges see, for instance, Crow and Singh 
(2000).  
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would necessarily require India and Bangladesh to both pay for any additional water 
transfers from Nepal requested by any one country.  
Bhaduri and Barbier develop a Stackelberg leader-follower game to determine the 
optimal water diverted by India, with and without augmentation provision. Given the 
unilateral externality involved in water diversion by upstream countries, and given the 
stronger position of India, India is the leader, and Bangladesh the follower. In the case of 
water augmentation, it is argued that the bargaining position of Bangladesh is improved, 
as the country can unilaterally buy additional water from Nepal, increasing water costs to 
India as well. However, examining past attempts at achieving a sharing agreement, when 
Bangladesh insisted on linking water sharing with proposals to augment dry season flows 
in the Ganges through transfers from Nepal, suggest that India would not gain from a 
water augmentation scheme. 
In the model, it is assumed that water is allocated initially between the two 
countries on the basis of proportional rights, and that both countries have the option of 
purchasing water from Nepal. Consumptive use of water is therefore maximised 
individually, given transfers from Nepal – that is, an augmentation treaty would establish 
(fixed) shares of water from Nepal for both India and Bangladesh. India has the option of 
deviating unilaterally from the Ganges’s treaty, rather than buying water from Nepal. By 
contrast, Bangladesh can only increase its water supply, by purchasing additional water 
from Nepal – who will release additional water only if both countries pay. Thus, buying 
more water from Nepal, Bangladesh forces India to buy additional water as well. 
Countries use water input from either the Ganges or Nepal’s water release, to 
produce economic goods, and maximise net profits. The game can be solved by backward 
induction, first solving for Bangladesh’s reaction function to any arbitrary share of water 
diverted by India, then solving India’s problem given Bangladesh’s reaction.  
The results of the model imply that, if India’s share of water from Nepal increases 
relative to Bangladesh’s, the optimal amount of water diversion for India will decrease. 
However, when water scarcity is not binding for India, and there is no provision for water 
augmentation, India’s profits are higher, and there is a larger diversion of water from the 
Ganges. India is better off without a water augmentation scheme, and has therefore no 
incentives to agree to it. The Ganges Water Treaty is therefore likely to become unstable,  
  25
unless ways of inducing India to negotiate a water augmentation treaty are found: if water 
scarcity becomes more stringent for India, the country will have strong incentives to 
defect from the treaty.  
The results of the analysis do provide policy directions, in that they show that a 
water augmentation treaty is unlikely to be signed – despite it being necessary. However, 
the results depend crucially on the assumptions that the cost of water released from Nepal 
is decreasing in quantity: although this may be realistic for relatively low levels because 
of the initial infrastructural investment, it is likely that political considerations would 
make water release politically costly at higher quantities, as shown by Supalla et al. 
(2002). If water supply costs to Nepal are not declining with quantity, Bangladesh’s 
threat is not credible, and the proposed augmentation scheme would not lead to a more 
stable agreement on the sharing of Ganges’ waters. In addition, the authors stop short of 
providing ways in which India could be encouraged to sign a binding and enforceable 
trilateral water augmentation agreement, as it is not individually rational for the country 
to do so. 
Despite the encouraging results of issue linkage care must be taken in identifying 
linking opportunities. Just and Netanyahu (2000) examine the circumstances under which 
issue linkage can lead to an enlarged bargaining set. In general, issue linkages are more 
successful when the games are strongly asymmetric, and there are equity concerns. 
Linking games can bring benefits when the resulting feasible choice set for both players 
is expanded, and when it makes new strategies possible, that are not possible under the 
two independent games. Under these circumstances, countries are more likely to 
exchange in-kind side payments than monetary payments, and to sustain self enforceable 
agreements. In their paper, Just and Netanyahu analyse various game structures 
(prisoner’s dilemma; assurance; iterated dominance; and chicken), and compare the 
outcome in the isolated 2-person, 2 strategy games to the outcome if the games are 
linked. It is shown that, for the case of two PD games, the linked outcome dominates the 
aggregated outcomes only when the payoff combinations are substantially different from 
the full cooperation case. In these cases, outcomes other than full cooperation are chosen 
out of equity concerns. In many cases, however, and contrary to general assertions, 
linking games does not generate an enlarged bargaining set (in Just and Netanyahu  
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(2000), p. 97). Moreover, even in cases when linking does expand the bargaining set, the 
equilibrium outcome may not be affected. When linking games other than PD, the 
benefits of issue linkage are significantly lower: in these cases, a significant proportion of 
the frontiers of the aggregated and the linked games overlap, suggesting that the chances 
of coming to a full cooperative equilibrium are not increased to a significant extent by 
issue linkage. 
The dominance of linking over aggregated payoff is obtained only when full 
cooperation is not  preferred: this may be because, although full cooperation may be 
efficient, it may not be equitable: players are therefore reluctant to pursue full 
cooperation, but partial cooperation strategies may be feasible, which give them a payoff 
preferred to non-cooperation and to full cooperation, given equity considerations. This 
may explain why, especially in the international arena, players pursue seemingly 
irrational strategies, and do not prefer full cooperation. 
2.4  Two level games 
As illustrated by the applications discussed so far, water allocation can be at two level – 
nationally, between different user groups, consumptive and non-consumptive uses, etc – 
and at the international level – among different countries sharing the same resource. 
Although discussed separately, these two levels are interrelated – how much water can be 
allocated among sectors ultimately depends on how much water is available – which may 
depend on how an international water body is divided. On the other hand, how much a 
country is willing to compromise on international water allocation may depend on its 
national settings, power groups, priorities, etc. Typically, a decision at one level has 
significant implications for the other level of negotiation: models which fail to take this 
interdependence into account may therefore be misleading.  
Two-level games (Putnam (1988)) provide some insights as to which agreement is 
to be expected, when two negotiation games are interdependent. According to Putnam, 
“the politics of many international negotiations can be conceived as a two-level game. At 
the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to 
adopt favourable policies and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among 
those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximise their own  
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ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of 
foreign developments” (p. 436). 
In their 1996 working paper, Richards and Singh (1996) provide a simplified 2-
level game of two countries bargaining over water allocation, when within country 
negotiations between two user groups also take place. State agents are assumed to be 
benevolent, and the initial allocation of water (both within and between countries) 
inefficient. Richards and Singh develop a cooperative model of bargaining for both levels 
of negotiation, on the assumption that the cooperative solution approximates the (more 
suitable) non cooperative game, when the discount rate is sufficiently low (as shown in 
Binmore et al. (1986)).  
In the paper by Richards and Singh (1996), there are 2 countries, A and B, and 
two groups within each country, 1 and 2 in country A, 3 and 4 in country B. Utility 
depends on two good, water, w, and a numeraire good, y. Utility functions are assumed to 
be quasi-linear, implying transferable utility, and the Pareto frontiers are straight lines or 
hyper-planes. The initial allocation of water and numeraire good is  i i y w , respectively, for 
i =1,…,4. Initial utility for group i is therefore  i i i i i i y w v y w u + = ) ( ) , ( . The initial utility is 
assumed to be the disagreement payoff, di, (or threat point) of the water bargaining game. 
Let wi
* denote the optimal water allocation. The condition for water optimality is 
that the marginal utility of water be equated across groups. The reallocation of water 
requires compensatory payments, ti
*. The optimal amount of water is uniquely 
determined, but the transfers of the numeraire good needed to sustain the optimal water 
allocation are determined by the outcome of the bargaining game(s).  
The bargaining game varies, according to the assumptions made with respect to 
the two levels of the game. For instance, when only national or international negotiations 
take place, the Nash bargaining solution (or its generalisation to n-players), with di as the 
disagreement payoffs, is the relevant model. On the other hand, when the negotiations at 
the two levels are linked, the disagreement payoffs change, and so does the Nash 
bargaining solution: 
-  when national negotiations are only a fallback strategies, if international 
negotiations between the four user groups fail, the disagreement payoff in  
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the international game is determined by the utilities to players in the 
national only negotiation game; 
-  when domestic negotiations take place only after successful negotiation 
between the countries, the international bargaining game takes the initial 
allocation of water as the disagreement point; 
-  if national bargaining always follows international bargaining, the 
disagreement points in the first game are given by the Nash bargaining 
solution to the game when only domestic negotiations take place
15. 
Comparing the equilibrium allocations of the bargaining games under the 
different scenarios, the following results emerge: 
-  a group may prefer domestic negotiations only to all-party international 
negotiations only, when its relative bargaining power is reduced in an all-
parties negotiations. 
-  All-parties and two-nations bargaining at the international levels give the 
same result. This generalisation, however, does not hold for other models: 
equivalence holds if the relative bargaining strength of domestic groups 
vs. each other is the same at both negotiation levels. 
-  International bargaining, followed by national bargaining independently of 
the outcome, is preferred by all parties to domestic negotiations alone. 
-  The country that gains more from a domestic agreement has a higher 
disagreement payoff at the international level, and therefore prefers to 
have negotiations which assume that domestic bargaining will always 
occur, independently of the results of the international bargaining. 
It appears clear that what matters in the determination of the outcome of the 
bargaining game is the disagreement point. Intuitively, the higher is the disagreement 
payoff relative to that of the others, the stronger is the bargaining position of the group or 
country. 
In the case of asymmetric countries, where one country can hold national 
negotiation in the event of failed international negotiations, whereas the other cannot, the 
country which is less flexible is penalised. It follows that it is a dominant strategy for 
                                                           
15 Other symmetric cases reduce to one of these three.  
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each national government to commit to domestic negotiations irrespective of what the 
other government does, as this improves the threat point in the international bargaining 
game. 
This paper shows, through the use of a simplified cooperative bargaining model 
with transferable utility and perfect information, that linked two-level (domestic and 
international) bargaining over water allocation leads to different results than national or 
international bargaining taken in isolation. The result is important in understanding why 
some agreement fail to be achieved, or do not seem to be efficient, when the bargaining 
model only accounts for either of the two levels and treats agents as monolithic. 
However, the use of the Nash bargaining solution as the solution concept may provide 
misleading results: although it does approximate the non-cooperative solution under 
certain conditions, it may not be the case in this context – especially when modelling 4 
parties negotiations. 
2.5  Water quality  
Determining the most desirable water quality levels – and how it should be attained – 
may also be subject to negotiation, between government and polluters, for instance. This 
is the approach taken by Sauer et al. (2003), who develop a model for negotiation over 
water pollution level between polluters and a regulating authority. Key to the bargaining 
model is the asymmetry in information (true pollution abatement costs are only known to 
polluters), and the use of market based instruments to reach the desired goal. 
The game is an extensive form game with two types of players – an authority and 
polluters – who alternate their proposal until an agreement is found, subject to 
environmental and financial constraints. The negotiation proceeds as follows: in the first 
step, the authority sets per unit pollution charge – which is not negotiable. Polluters 
respond by proposing a development project which would help reducing emissions, and 
the required financial support from the authority. This is to be financed through pollution 
charges. The authority ranks the proposal according to their cost effectiveness (cost per 
unit of pollution abated), and agrees to fund the most effective projects within the fund’s 
limits. The discussion continues until a solution is agreed upon, which also meets the 
required environmental quality.  
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Šauer et al apply the model to an ideal case on the basis of river pollution levels 
and emission charges in the Czech Republic, with the goal of achieving the best 
distribution of Fund’s money to polluters. In the first negotiation round, the authority sets 
the vector of unit payments for each pollutant j, denoted by pj. These unit charges are 
taken from Czech regulations. The authority also computes the amount of payments to 




z p , where zij is the emission of pollutant j by 
polluter i. In the second stage, polluters compute the minimum subsidy requirement for 
the abatement investment, Di, and provide information about the abated level of emission, 
ei. Authorities are now in a position to rank proposed projects, and establish which ones 
will be funded given their budget constraint. If some funds remain unused, they are 
brought forward to the next time period. Polluters evaluate the subsidy support and, in the 
last round of negotiation, the outcome of the proposed solution is evaluated in terms of its 
environmental impact. If the minimum environmental quality is met, binding agreements 
are signed, and the negotiated plan is implemented. In the simulated results, the 
environmental constraints were met in round one of the negotiation. 
This model presents an offer-counteroffer bargaining procedure, where agreement 
is sought over the distribution of subsidies for “environmental technologies”, which 
improve the quality of river water. The central authority bargains individually with 
polluters, but the strategic behaviour of polluters is not analysed in depth. In addition, 
there is no bargaining over the desired level of environmental quality – which is instead 
set by legislation. Yet, it is shown in the theoretical models (see Negotiation Theory – 
Part 1) that the issue space matters in determining the negotiated outcome. It is possible 
to envisage two different solutions to the game: either polluters cooperate on some or all 
environmental improving projects, and agree on how to share the costs and benefits of 
cooperation; or each polluter acts individually, in a non-cooperative fashion, without 
considering possible synergies with other operators. 
Similarly, Kerschbamer and Maderner explore the implications of information 
asymmetries on the equilibrium compensation payments required by an upstream country 
to reduce river pollution. As illustrated in the models by Ambec and Sprumont (2000), 
Kilgour and Dinar (1995), and Kilgour and Dinar (2001), in the case of shared river the  
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unidirectionality of the externality implies that upstream countries have no incentives to 
cooperate, whereas downstream countries would stand to gain from cooperation: side 
payments are required to induce the upstream country to participate in the cooperative 
agreement.  
Whereas water allocation was the issue in these models, the model by 
Kerschbamer et al investigates the implications for river pollution. In their simplified 
model, a downstream country, d, proposes a package to an upstream country, u, which 
pollutes the river
16. This package consists in the desired level of pollution abatement on 
behalf of u, and in the compensation offered by d to u to achieve this abatement level. 
However, because of asymmetries in information, the victim is unable to determine with 
certainty polluter’s preferences towards environmental protection: the observed river 
quality level may be the result of ambient pollution, or of uncontrolled emissions of the 
upstream country.  
In contrast with the existing literature, this model compares the agreement 
solution with the equilibrium status quo situation, in which the two players maximise 
their own utility, taking other’s actions as given – with respect to the Nash-Cournot 
solution, therefore. In the negotiation case, the offer of compensation by d implies two 
opposing incentives for u: (1) to understate own concern for the environment, and 
overestimate the benefits of the status quo. This would require d to offer higher 
compensation to induce u to participate in the agreement. And (2), to overstate own 
concern for the environment, so as to induce d to believe that high environmental 
standards are already applied, and any additional emission reduction is therefore very 
costly.  
The authors show that, in equilibrium, the second effect dominates the first, and 
the optimal bribe is such that the more caring polluters may be induced to refuse it – that 
is, the equilibrium abatement level of all players, but the least caring one, is distorted 
downwards. This result is in contrast with existing literature, which suggests that under 
asymmetric information the binding incentive problem is to prevent polluters from 
claiming not to care about the environment. The difference in result is generated by the 
                                                           
16 As in the case of bargaining games with side-payments, one could argue that this approach is not 
desirable because it seems to confute the polluter pays principle (vs. the victim pays principle). See also 
Footnote 10.   
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different starting point of the negotiation – that is, whereas in this paper the starting point 
is the equilibrium Nash-Cournot solution, previous literature derived solutions from non-
equilibrium  status quo. In a Nash-Cournot solution, the more caring polluters have 
already implemented higher environmental standards. 
When economic sectors use water in a non-consumptive way, competition may 
arise when different water levels and quality are preferred by each sector. This is the case 
analysed by Krawczyk and Tidball (2003), who develop a model for intertemporal 
competition for water levels in the Camargue region in southern France. In this two 
person, finite horizon dynamic game, fishermen and watercress producers have 
conflicting interests over water levels – with the former preferring high level of water, 
and the latter lower water levels. Simulation results show that sustaining the natural water 
level is not possible in a decentralised way, through non cooperative behaviour, and 
government intervention is therefore necessary to lessen the negative impacts of agents’ 
economic activities: it is in fact possible for a Government to compel agents to a 
feedback Nash equilibrium where environmental standards are obeyed. 
Roseta-Palma (2002), on the other hand, combines dynamic models of 
groundwater exploitation to aquifer pollution models, where the externality comes from 
productive activities, with the aim of analysing the interaction between quality-quantity 
trade-offs. Despite its simplifying assumptions, the model provides some interesting 
results: when taking joint decisions over quality and quantity, for instance, the efficient-
steady state polluting activities may be higher than the one chosen under private, 
uncoordinated resource management, as long as steady-state water quality is higher. 
Despite the interesting and stimulating results, however, this model of water quality-
quantity does not explicitly represent the bargaining process among competing, 
uncoordinated agents exploiting or otherwise affecting groundwater resources.  
 
3  Negotiation Support System Tools 
In general, game theoretic models provide descriptions of the negotiation process, and 
prescriptions of how players should behave. However, as experimental evidence has 
shown, the predictions of the standard theoretical models are often not realised in real  
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negotiation processes, and the models are therefore not very useful as decision support 
tools. The complexity of many negotiation problems calls for the use of computer models 
to support the process: negotiation is viewed as a kind of multiparty decision making 
activity: through strategies and movements, players try to achieve points within the 
bargaining space, or  an acceptance region. The process of negotiating does not only 
entail the presentation of proposals and compromises, but also the attempts of players to 
elicit opponents’ preferences and strategies. Parties to the negotiation must attempt to 
identify and explore the impacts of various alternatives, the ensuing cost and benefit 
sharing scheme, etc.  
Negotiation Support System (NSS) are a special case of Decision Support System, 
where the tool is designed to support the process of negotiation (p.260, Holsapple et al. 
(1997)) when there is disagreement among various parties as to what decision to adopt. In 
order for an NSS to be developed, stakeholders and stakeholders’ preferences need to be 
well defined. The programme itself must be flexible enough to accommodate changing 
issues and preferences, not to constrain or limit the options and their identification 
(Thiesse et al. (1998)).  
NSS can provide support for a variety of issues, and at different stages of the 
negotiation process: NSS can therefore be classified according to their function as either 
Negotiation Preparation Systems – supporting pre-negotiation strategic planning – or as 
Negotiation Information Management Systems – facilitating negotiation in real time. The 
latter group can be further classified into Negotiation Context Support System models – 
which focus on the behaviour of the system, and how it evolves, given some strategic 
choices; and Negotiation Process Support System models, which are instead concerned 
with the process of negotiations and the dynamics involved, identifying possible areas of 
agreement among conflicting parties. These NSS are designed to assist the negotiation 
process by increasing the likelihood that a mutually beneficial agreement is found, or by 
improving on an inefficient agreement.  
The literature on negotiation support tools is varied, and mostly focuses on the 
conceptual developments of software and models. However, a few applications to water 
negotiations can be found. We will present in what follows some examples of NSS 
developed for resolving water conflicts. In the first part, Negotiation Context Support  
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Systems will be discussed through the Multi-Agent and Agent-Based Systems discussed 
by Becu et al. (2003) and Barreteau et al. (2003), and the status quo analysis illustrated 
by Li et al. (2004). The development and use of Negotiation Process Support System 
models is on the other hand represented by two applications, by Thiesse et al. (1998) and 
Hämäläinen et al. (2001). 
3.1  Negotiation Context Support System Models 
In order to enter effectively into negotiations and to facilitate the achievement of an 
agreement, stakeholders need descriptive and integrative models of the issues to be 
negotiated. This is the idea behind the use of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) to simulate 
different water management scenarios, and hence help parties to identify the preferred 
management solution.  
Becu et al. (2003) developed a MAS to simulate small catchment water, in order 
to facilitate water management in Thailand. CATCHSCAPE enables the simulation of a 
catchment’s features, as well as farmers’ individual decisions. CATCHSCAPE is an 
integrative, spatially distributed and individually-based model – able to cope with the 
complexity and dynamics of catchment management issues. The NSS is composed of: a 
biophysical module, simulating the hydro geological cycle, irrigation scheme 
management, and crop and vegetation dynamics; a social module, describing the social 
dynamics in terms of resources (land, water, cash and labour force). Water management 
is described according to the different level of water control (collective, individual, 
catchment).  
To increase models’ flexibility, Barreteau et al. (2003) propose an Agent-Based 
Simulation (ABS) tool to support negotiations over water allocation among farmers in the 
Drome river valley in the South of France. Their work is based on an experiment 
conducted on water allocation rules. 
The major water use in the Drome river valley is for agriculture: for this reason, 
the focus of the research is on NSS to support the allocation of water to irrigation. The 
first model, SimSage, was developed to assess the collective consequences of various 
scenarios of water allocation rules, and resource availability. Scenarios were generated in 
terms of downstream water flow levels, occurrence of crisis, water pumping restriction  
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levels, etc. The simulated scenarios were then presented to farmers for discussion, and for 
choosing the best policy alternative. A second model was developed, the GibiDrome, in 
order to tackle new requirements – such as the definition of practically enforceable 
allocation rules. This second model used the same input data and assumptions as 
SimSage, but a different architecture. GibiDrome is an ABM in which each class of 
agents has a set of variables to choose, satisfying given constraints, and interactions with 
other agents.  
GibiDrome has proven to be much more flexible than SimSage, as it was designed 
to accept new scenarios of complementary resources. The flexibility of programming 
characteristics of ABM makes these tools more suitable for this type of negotiation, 
which takes place in highly evolving contexts.  
In assessing their usefulness as negotiation support tools, the authors conclude 
that ABM, in addition to being flexible, enlarge the field of information to stakeholders, 
and reveal connections between components of the model, which would not otherwise be 
apparent. ABMs are thus efficient at supporting negotiations, facilitating the organisation 
and management of the collective decision making process. ABM models may act as 
catalysts to generate discussion among stakeholders, playing a role akin to Single Text 
Negotiation procedures, and help in identifying factors of strategic relevance. Precisely 
for this reason, according to the authors the exercise of building the ABM model in a 
participatory way – that is, choosing the values and variables to be included together with 
stakeholders – may be more valuable than the realism of the model itself. Li et al. (2004) 
model conflict over water sharing between the US and Canada as a strategic conflict 
amongst different interest groups, adopting a graph approach. The graph model of 
conflict resolution is a simple but efficient decision support tool, which takes as the unit 
of analysis the outcome of the conflict, rather than individuals’ choices. It is implemented 
using decision support systems, which speed up the stability analysis, and hence make the 
tool more useful as a decision support tool. Players’ preferences are considered when 
conducting a stability analysis, that is, when individual and aggregate stabilities of a state 
are analysed
17. Stability analysis is essentially a static exercise, treating each possible 
                                                           
17 The stability of a state can be assessed using a variety of concepts, from individual/collective rationality 
to sequential stability.  
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outcome individually, and assessing whether players have individual or collective 
incentives to deviate from it. It does not address the issue of how the state is achieved. 
Starting from the status quo, the graph method can be used to analyse the 
evolution of the conflict, and assesses the likelihood that a given solution to the conflict is 
reached (status quo analysis). This exercise can provide useful insights on whether a 
status is attainable, and how a player should act or interact with other players, to direct 
the conflict to the desired solution.  
A status quo analysis diagram is a directed graph, rooted in the status quo. The 
basic components are states, and moves and countermoves of players are then represented 
as direct arcs joining the states. At each iterative step, an algorithm determines which 
states can be reached at each stage, by examining the list of unidirectional improving 
states that are attainable at the immediate previous step for all players
18. Two consecutive 
moves by one player are ruled out. The process stops when no more states or arcs can be 
added to the diagram.  
From the status quo analysis, it is possible to assess the reachability of outcomes – 
only those which appear in the graph are attainable. Outcomes which only have incoming 
arcs are strong equilibria, and satisfy stability conditions. The graph analysis allows the 
identification of paths leading to a desired equilibrium, and can therefore prescribe 
strategies to guide the conflict towards the desired direction. 
The status quo analysis is applied a posteriori in this paper to the water disputes 
in the Flathead river, which flows from British Columbia (Canada) into Flathead Lake in 
Montana (US). The methodology assesses the reachability of the equilibria, and examines 
the dynamics of the conflict, as it evolved from 1988 onwards. The set of possible 
outcomes, given players’ strategies, is identified, and listed. Preference ranking over 
feasible set for each of the four players is then inferred from players’ behaviour, and 
imposed on the feasible states
19. Stability analysis is carried out on all the outcomes: the 
application of the method identifies three strong equilibrium solutions to this conflict, 
which are the therefore most likely outcomes. Status quo analysis is then carried out, 
                                                           
18 Other algorithms have been developed, which allow the any unilateral move. These may lead to different 
conclusions about the feasibility of equilibria. 
19 The graph model can handle both transitive and intransitive preferences. However, in this case, 
preferences are assumed to be transitive.  
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using a NSS to implement the graph-generating algorithm. Feasible equilibria, and paths 
to reach them, are identified: of the 55 possible outcomes identified in stability analysis, 
only 23 may be reached from the status quo, provided that players can only make 
unilateral improving moves. The model singles out three strong equilibria, and the paths 
to reach them. And in fact it is one of these equilibria that materialised in the actual 
negotiation process, consistent with one of the three shortest paths in the status quo 
analysis. 
3.2  Negotiation Process Support System Model 
Whilst the previous NSS were concerned with predicting the possible outcomes and 
simulating various scenarios, the Interactive Computer-Assisted Negotiation Process 
Support System (ICANS) guides parties in real time negotiation towards the selection of 
a mutually beneficial agreement in a dynamic, multiple issues, multilateral negotiation 
(Thiesse et al. (1998)). 
ICANS supports the identification of relevant issues, as well as their 
feasible/acceptable ranges. Information on parties’ preference over single issues, as well 
as ranking of those issues, must be provided (confidentially), to construct partial relative 
satisfaction functions. ICANS creates internal measures of total relative satisfactions for 
each party, from any set of issue values. These are based on party’s relative satisfaction 
functions – one for each issue – aggregated to a total satisfaction function. In this way, 
comparison among multiple alternative proposals for each party are possible. From this 
information, the NSS is able to generate an acceptable set of issue values, starting from 
parties’ individual proposals. The alternative generated by ICANS will be such that, for 
every party, it is (at least) equivalent in terms of relative satisfaction to their initial 
proposal. If such an alternative does not exist, then the alternative generated by ICANS 
will be such that each party’s total relative satisfaction will be reduced by a minimum 
equal amount. Once a tentative agreement is identified, ICANS will explore possible 
Pareto improving alternatives. In order to move the agreement towards the Pareto 
frontier, ICANS find those values that maximise the minimum gain in total relative 
satisfaction, while assuring that the total net gain to all parties cannot be further 
improved.   
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Thiesse et al tested the effectiveness of ICANS in a series of limited controlled 
experiments with simulated two party water resources conflicts. Issues to be negotiated 
over varied from 2 to 7. The results suggest that programmes like ICANS can help 
negotiators find an agreement, and then improve on the agreement. However, equity 
issues are not incorporated in the NSS, nor can they be, unless players are prepared to 
make subjective judgments about the relative worth of benefits to different parties. The 
usefulness of NSS programmes depends on the willingness of parties to supply (truthful) 
information about their preferences and ranking: concerns over the possibility that parties 
may try to influence the outcome of the negotiation by providing false information 
remain, but it is not clear whether players can indeed determine the effectiveness of 
cheating.  
The use of multi-criteria decision making software as a basis for supporting water 
negotiation is also explored by Hämäläinen et al. (2001). The framework proposed starts 
from the multi-criteria structuring and modelling phase, and ends in the final negotiation 
support. The NSS is tested with two role-playing groups to assess the method of 
improving directions – an iterative method for identifying Pareto-optimal alternatives. 
The proposed NSS differs from ICANS discussed by Thiesse et al in the algorithm and 
method adopted to generate improving alternatives from the initial tentative agreement: 
however, as pointed out by various authors, there exist a variety of methodologies that 
can be used to generate compromises, and improve on them. Direct comparison among 
different NSS is however not useful, as they rest of different assumptions and rely on 
different procedures. The choice of which methodology should be used depends crucially 
on the constitutional structure of the negotiation process. 
The process is organised in three phases. Initially, the stakeholders are identified, 
together with their most important decision criteria. In this structuring phase, the decision 
variables are chosen – in this case, the decision variable is target water levels at different 
times of the year. Value tree analysis can be used to evaluate the range of admissible 
values for the control variables, as well as their likely impacts on other variables of 
relevance (e.g. risk of flooding, ecological factors,…). In the second stage, a set of 
Pareto-optimal alternative is generated, using the method of improving directions and the 
related Joint Gains NSS – based on the Single Negotiation Text negotiation strategy. In  
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the final phase, the identified Pareto-optimal alternatives are ranked by stakeholders, and 
through joint problem representation, agreement over one alternative is sought. 
The three-steps procedure is applied to water level regulation in a lake-river 
system in Finland (Lake Paijanne, Lakes Konnivesi and Routsalainen, and River 
Kymijoki). Major interest groups and interests are identified, together with the values that 
need to be maximised through management of water levels (the control variables), such 
as water quality, economic benefit, electricity generation, etc.  
Starting from the status quo, parties’ preferences are identified locally, by asking 
to compare alternatives. In this way, the direction of improvement for each player can be 
identified. Only local preferences are required, so that players’ utility functions need not 
be completely described, and only a part of this local information needs to be revealed to 
the mediator.  
The basic principle of the method of improving direction
20 is to produce a 
sequence of moves such that subsequent alternatives are preferred by all parties to the 
previous ones, so that the set of efficient alternatives is gradually approached. Starting at 
an initial alternative, parties’ preferences about alternative in the neighbourhood are 
identified. Directions along which alternatives are preferred to the initial point are 
therefore singled out – these are the directions along which players gain most compared 
to other directions (utility function gradient direction), and can be identified by selecting 
the player’s most preferred alternative on an appropriately chosen circle around the initial 
point. A jointly improving direction can then be calculated solving a non-linear 
optimisation problem. The next step is to find a jointly preferred alternative on the jointly 
improving direction. The procedure is repeated until jointly improving alternatives cannot 
be found. 
The resulting NSS was tested in two role-playing experiments. These showed that 
players can understand the method, and answer the required questions consistently. The 
experiments support the use of gradient methods of optimisation – significant 
improvements can already be seen after two iterations. In addition, the method of 
improving direction allows learning, and changes in preferences during the process. 
                                                           
20 For a detail exposition of the method, see Hämäläinen et al. (2001).  
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It should be noted that this method can only be useful when the objectives and 
preferences of players are not completely opposite to those of another because, in this 
case, almost all feasible alternatives become Pareto optimal. In these situations, NSS 
could be based on generating specific bargaining solutions based on different fairness 
rules. For instance, the adjusted winner procedure proposed by Brams and Taylor (1996, 
2000) for allocating different goods among different parties has received a lot of attention 
in the literature. 
The aim of NSS should be to offer negotiators the possibility of defining and 
evaluating possible settlements: however, despite the (theoretical) potential of NSS tools 
to help decision makers to manage conflicts over water use (and other types of conflict), 
most NSS reported in the literature are still in the conceptual stage, and play a relatively 
passive role in the negotiation process. Often, they support a professional mediator, rather 
than the negotiating parties themselves. Yet decision makers could benefit from improved 
tools to identify the zone of agreement when there are conflicting interests, and to 
improve on the agreement, when this is not efficient. Not only is the development of NSS 
in its initial stage, but also, and perhaps more importantly, there remains a gap between 
scientists working in the field, and decision makers who would benefit from the tool.  
Recent developments are encouraging, but more efforts are needed at integrating 
formal theories into NSS development, and in disseminating the use of such a tool in real-
life negotiation settlements.  
 
4  Concluding comments 
Many natural resource and environmental problems involve negotiations over how to 
share resources, or how to determine their quality. Most of the economic literature 
addresses these problems from an optimisation point of view, specifying a priori the 
characteristics that the agreements should have – most notably, (economic) efficiency. 
Yet, non-cooperative game theory can not only provide a useful framework for deciding 
how to better share or manage a common resource, but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, it can help identify which mechanisms and management regimes can be  
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implemented and sustained in situations where enforcement is problematic, or binding 
agreements cannot be signed. 
In fact, the existence of a negotiated settlement Pareto-superior to non-cooperative 
behaviour is no guarantee that the players will agree to cooperate: a shift in emphasis is 
needed, towards the development of negotiation models which make no assumptions 
about which agreement will be reached, but rather provide a structure for the negotiation 
process itself. Given the complexity of the processes and issues often involved, NSS have 
a high potential to help in the process of finding an agreement acceptable to all parties, 
and on improving on that agreement. The proposed approach may support the negotiation 
process either directly or indirectly, by shortening the time-span needed to reach an 
agreement through the (theoretical) identification of an “acceptability space”. That is, the 
values for which a proposal is more likely to be accepted are identified, and proposals 
which would be (almost) certainly rejected can be ruled out at the outset. The negotiation 
process can then start directly with acceptable agreements, improving on them.  
Alternatively, when the tool is used to support policy making, it can help select a 
set of policies which is self-enforcing and, therefore, acceptable. As shown in various 
papers, the self-enforcing allocation is not necessarily the one which is most efficient 
from the economic point of view, but rather the one which is socially and/or politically 
acceptable as well. 
It must indeed be realised that efficiency cannot be the only criterion against 
which to judge the agreed allocation scheme: other issues, such as perceived equity, 
political power, and strategic considerations, play a key role in negotiations – especially 
for resources such as water, which are politically charged. “Optimal” management 
schemes – that is, regimes which are least cost and waste no resource – may not be 
feasible and/or socially acceptable, hence leading to a failure of implementation, or even 
to outright rejection of the policy. The value added of exploring management problems 
within a non-cooperative bargaining framework is indeed related to the extent to which 
the approach helps finding politically and socially acceptable compromises, as political 
and social constraints are often disregarded in economic analyses. 
Finally, what is still missing in the literature is a negotiation model which 
considers also incomplete information over the resource itself. A multiple issues, multiple  
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parties negotiation model, which explicitly addresses the bargaining process without 
making assumptions over which allocation should be achieved, and which accounts for 
the stochasticity of the resource, as well as the political, social and strategic feasibility of 
any allocation scheme, would significantly contribute to decreasing conflicts over water.   
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